Sr. Ruth Lautt, O.P., Fair Witness National Director, says "What the documents from the post-Annapolis talks reveal is that members of the respective negotiating teams shared pragmatic talk about borders, Jerusalem and refugees. While there was not complete agreement on core issues, there was hope of reaching a compromise. A 'Palestine Paper' dated August 31, 2008, memorializes Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's peace proposal package. But there is no indication that Palestinian President Abbas ever came back with a counteroffer."The account in the Palestine Papers that Abbas failed to come back with a counteroffer is reflected in Olmert's account of what he and Abbas talked about. In an interview on November 28, 2009, Olmert's description of that September 16, 2008 meeting corroborates the Palestine Papers claim that Abbas failed to make a counteroffer:
The "Palestine Papers" reflect claims about an alleged counteroffer, but no evidence that one was ever relayed to Olmert. A December 14, 2008 memo shows Saeb Erekat telling Israeli negotiator Udi Deckel that the Palestinian counteroffer had been 1.9%. It appears, however, that 1.9% was a number Palestinian negotiators had been discussing with the Israeli negotiators prior to the Olmert offer. And, as Deckel points out, "discussions on territory" between negotiators do not constitute a leader's response to a comprehensive peace offer.
An internal Palestinian document reveals that Abbas never intended to respond to the offer at his September 16, 2008 meeting with Olmert, which he regarded as merely "ceremonial." A memo drafted in preparation for that meeting states:
In order to avoid the blame game, the President [Abbas] today is going with a positive attitude, where he will ask more questions from Olmert on his offer, and he will tell him that the Palestinians will respond later.
There is no record of a subsequent response from Abbas.
"On the 16th of September, 2008, I presented him (Abbas) with a comprehensive plan. It was based on the following principles...There is of course no downside for Abbas in this: on the one hand the fact that he failed to do what was necessary to finalize a peace agreement will counter the arguments that he and his team betrayed the Palestinian Arabs in making concessions for peace--and on the other hand, the West is always willing, if not eager, to ignore the fact that Abbas refuses to do or concede anything that might bring about peace.
Olmert says he showed Abbas a map, which embodied all these plans. Abbas wanted to take the map away. Olmert agreed, so long as they both signed the map. It was, from Olmert's point of view, a final offer, not a basis for future negotiation. But Abbas could not commit. Instead, he said he would come with experts the next day.
"He (Abbas) promised me the next day his adviser would come. But the next day Saeb Erekat rang my adviser and said we forgot we are going to Amman today, let's make it next week. I never saw him again."
Technorati Tag: Palestine Papers and Palileaks.
1 comment:
Abu Bluff has the best of all worlds. Why rush to make a peace agreement with Israel when he enjoys international support and future Arab regimes will stiffen Palestinian rejectionism. I'd be doing the same thing in his place.
Post a Comment