Is Israeli Dual Citizenship A Security Risk?

After posting Government: Jews Cannot Be Trusted, I took a look around and found a transcript of a Washington Post forum from March 2005, Jobs Live: Security Clearances led by Derrick Dortch, a career counselor who specializes in government job searching and military transition.

Among the questions asked was one from Jerusalem:

Jerusalem, Israel: I recently immigrated to Israel from the U.S. I may move back to the US in a few years. Would I be able to get a job that requires security clearance since I obtained foreign citizenship? I still hold U.S. citizenship.

Derrick Dortch: Hello Jerusalem,

Thanks for your question. Foreign Preference and Dual Citizenship is a major concern for the United States and can be a major factor in the security clearance process. Pre 9/11 it was a concern but not as major. Post 9/11 it is now a major concern. Most individuals are asked to give their full allegiance to the United States and give up their dual citizenship. This is a case-by-case situation but you should be prepared to do so.

Here is what the Adjudicative Desk Reference says about foreign preference:
The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
a. The exercise of dual citizenship;
b. Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
c. Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
d. Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
e. Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
f. Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
g. Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
h. Voting in foreign elections; and
i. Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
a. Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
b. Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
c. Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
d. Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.

You can find out more here:
http://www.dss.mil/nf/adr/adjguid/adjguidF.htm [this link is no longer good. Try this instead]

If you are ever thinking about coming back to the U.S. and being involved in national and/or homeland security you need to understand these and then be prepared when you come back.

Take care and I wish you the best.

Dortch also has a general article on getting a security clearance written for the Washington Post, noting among other things that it is not only federal employees who may need to have security clearance:

There are also many companies – think tanks, research facilities and other organizations – that have contracts or grants with the federal government that require them to access sensitive information. These companies or organizations are required to have their employees cleared by the federal government. No company without a contract with the federal government can independently give or seek a security clearance, and no individual who is not working for the federal government or a contract organization can get a security clearance.

The document that Dortch refers to in the forum, Adjudicative Guidlines For Determining Eligibility for Access To Classified Information, deals not only with foreign preference, but also foreign influence:

The Concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

a. An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;

b. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;

c. Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;

d. Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;

e, Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;

f. Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;

g. Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;

h. A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

a. A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;

b. Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official U.S. Government business;

c. Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;

d. The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;

e. Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.

These are just some of issues that have taken on added emphasis post 9-11.

See also: Government: Jews Cannot Be Trusted

Technorati Tag: Israel and Dual Citizenship and Security Clearance and AIPAC.