Monday, October 15, 2007

Making Annapolis Into Can-napolis?

What--if anything--can be achieved at the Olmert-Abbas summit in Annapolis next month? Barry Rubin offers some pragmatic ideas for making something out of what many think is a waste of time.
And What Do We Get?
Barry Rubin
October 14, 2007

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is about to be the topic of an international summit and optimism is breaking out all over.

A breakthrough to comprehensive peace, however, is very unlikely. Hamas controls the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian Authority (PA)-Fatah leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is weak; Fatah is still overwhelmingly radical and has not conducted the internal debate—much less public education effort—necessary for a change of policy.

At the same time, however, a situation breeding persistent crisis and violence won’t go away. It is important to try to prevent the conflict from growing worse, including a possible Hamas takeover on the West Bank or full-scale war. If this is a long-term stalemate it need be structured in a way conducive to greater stability. And if it is possible to move even a bit toward building an eventual peace that is a good thing.

So the immediate question is whether intensive Israel-PA talks and the summit meeting can keep the mess from getting worse or even help bring some modest improvement.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated, "We must give negotiations a chance. Israel has excellent excuses to justify stagnation in the talks. I don't mean to look for excuses. I'm determined to give a chance to a meaningful diplomatic process….”

Or, in other words, even though we have every reason not to negotiate with an unstable regime that cannot meet commitments, we’re willing to try in hopes that it could work. That makes sense, albeit with reservations expressed below.
Olmert explained, "The current Palestinian leadership is not a terrorist leadership. [Abbas] and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are committed to all the agreements signed with Israel, and I believe that they want to move ahead together with us…."

Olmert chose his words carefully. Abbas and Fayyad want peace and would like to keep their agreements. But he would find it hard to provide any more names to that list. Most Fatah leaders don’t think that way. And even those who “want” to advance probably cannot and will not do so. They may not personally promote terrorism but do little to stop it, even failing to curb the extremism of official PA-controlled media.

Is it worth trying talks? Yes. Aside from showing the world Israel’s peaceful intentions there might be small successes. The level of conflict could be lowered, PA-Fatah preserved, international help obtained, Arab states brought into deeper engagement.

Yet in almost all this discussion, debate, international policymaking, and media coverage there is a missing element. There’s lots of talk about what Palestinians want, and what Israel might or should give, in negotiations. But there is virtually nothing said about what Israel should get for running these risks and making these concessions.

Or, as Bob Dylan put it, "Oh, no, no I've been through this movie before!” The PA-Fatah demands are clear: An independent Palestinian state with capital in east Jerusalem and borders on the 1948-1967 era ceasefire lines. All Palestinian refugees and their descendants must be allowed to live in Israel; all Palestinian prisoners, no matter how many Israeli civilians they deliberately murdered, released.

We know all this already. The return idea is unacceptable and this won’t change. It is a sign of Palestinian insincerity since the goal is to wipe Israel off the map. If Palestinians want a state of their own they would insist the refugees settle there. Prisoners might be released only if it is certain they will not return to terrorism either because a Palestinian government allowed it or even encouraged them to do so.

Israel is ready to accept an independent state. There is debate about east Jerusalem and the 1967 lines but a solution could be found. For example, in 2000 Israel’s government offered most of east Jerusalem and almost all the West Bank, with territorial swaps to make up for any land annexed by Israel.

But what does the Palestinian side offer Israel? That is very unclear. What does “peace” mean? A full end of the conflict? An energetic will to stop anti-Israel incitement and cross-border terrorism? And what of Hamas? The following points are what the Palestinian side must give. None of them are too onerous, especially compared to the rewards they would get:
  • The conflict would be ended. Over. Finished.

  • Palestinian refugees would be resettled in Palestine.

  • The PA-Fatah-PLO would energetically work to bring Arab states into the peace arrangement.

  • Palestine would block terrorist attacks from its territory on Israel by force if needed and stop the systematic incitement of hatred, certainly on the official level, against Israel.

  • No foreign troops would be permitted on Palestine’s territory.
There also has to be serious international recognition, safeguards, and guarantees for the risks Israel is taking. Israel is negotiating with people who have no control over much of the territory or people on whose behalf they speak.

Hamas will reject any agreement and do everything possible to wreck it, including killing PA leaders and launching terrorist attacks to force Fatah to guard Israel’s borders or throw away the agreement. Israel is negotiating with people who have no control over much of the territory or people on whose behalf they speak.

Beyond this, if Hamas were to take over the West Bank or any Palestinian state, it would immediately restart the conflict, using Israeli concessions to be more deadly.

And there’s more bad news If Abbas and Fayyad made a deal along the above lines—or ones even better for the Palestinians—all the supporters of Hamas and smaller radical groups plus up to half or more of Fatah itself would denounce them as traitors and reject the agreement.

Focusing only on what Israel must give and ignoring the other side of the equation is a formula for continuing conflict.

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