At this stage it is clear that the party that bore the main brunt of concession, which made the agreement possible, was Hamas: the Egyptian proposal accepted by both parties was presented in October 2010, on the basis of Abbas’ ideas, and on October 14, Fatah agreed to it. At the time Hamas rejected it out of hand; it has now changed its position, apparently because it is not at all sure that the developments in the Arab world are to its benefit.It makes it that much more difficult to event consider the idea that Hamas is somehow the weak sister forced to make concessions, when the article undercuts itself:
From Hamas' point of view of, the deadlock in the peace process has removed an obstacle to a reconciliation agreement, since Abbas insisted that even after the reconciliation agreement, he would continue negotiations with Israel on a permanent agreement. If the negotiations are in any case not viable, Hamas does not need to fear a concession on this issue.Curiouser and curiouser:
If the agreement is a result of Hamas weakness and not a sign of its strength, it is worth examining whether it is possible to create a situation whereby the president of the Palestinian Authority and the government of technocrats continue to maintain their present relationship with Israel, and Hamas is forced to swallow this and cooperate with a process that is ultimately liable to threaten it. Abbas himself hinted at this possibility when he said that the negotiations with Israel are not the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority government, but of the PLO, and that he, as head of the PLO, intends to continue them even after the establishment of the unity government. Participation in the Palestinian government and the holding of elections will also create more serious pressure on Hamas to work for quiet in the Gaza Strip, which in turn can help advance the diplomatic process. It appears that the Obama administration has elements that could support this approach; it is doubtful that there are counterparts in the current Israeli government.And what exactly is the 'present relationship with Israel'--other than demanding concessions and planning declaring an independent state?
And what is this about 'holding elections'--if after 2+ years there haven't been any, is it really likely that Hamas (or Abbas) is going to agree to them, considering the current wave of demand for reform in the Middle East?
Finally, when is the last time we saw Hamas cooperate in anything that is a threat to it?
I double-checked: the article was written in 2011, not in 2006 when there were all kinds of predictions of Hamas being forced to mellow once they took office.
Truth be told though, flowers do bring out Haniyeh's winsome smile, don't you think?
Technorati Tag: Fatah and Hamas.
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