I think it's possible Americans could be persuaded that we must step it up and achieve an unambiguous military victory in Iraq to prevent terrorists from winning a share of power in an outcome that would be a humiliating defeat of the U.S. (which would be seen as confirming bin Laden's claims that we lack resolve). That is a national interest that people can support, ardently, if the case can be made convincingly.That is part of Israel's own problem--that unlike the US in Iraq, Israel does not even have the possibility of an unambiguous victory, and so has lost the stomach for a protracted conflict with no end in sight.
But making the case for an unambiguous victory in Iraq is problematic. According to McCarthy, it would be an uphill for Bush to make the case for an unambiguous victory in Iraq, and the reasons he gives that mitigate against decisive military action are reminiscent of the Oslo mentality:
But that case would have to be made. And making it would be an uphill battle at a time when (a) the debate at home has become about drawing down our presence, (b) the public case for why military victory in Iraq is crucial to success in the overall war on terror has long been neglected, (c) the administration has told the country that major combat operations are over and establishing a democratic Iraqi government is what matters, (d) the American people have understandably come to view Iraqis as not nearly grateful enough for all we have sacrificed on their behalf, and (e) Iraq is looming so large in the coming mid-term elections.In Israel's case as well, you don't hear talk about what it takes to gain a conclusive victory and security against her enemies. Instead--
a. The debate in Israel is now less about exercising military force and more about defensive and preventative measures such as the Security Fence and the Disengagement.
b. The Israeli government seems to no longer take the long view that the conflict is a war and therefore a real threat to its very existence, but rather as a series of terrorist attacks to react to and limit.
c. The Israeli government says now the need is not military actions, but negotiations with a democratically elected government.
d. The Palestinians Arabs are not seen as having moderate representatives and a real desire for peace, making negotiations seem pointless while ironically handing them land.
e. The Palestinians Arabs in general--and Hamas in particular--figured in the elections, in terms of the sacrifices, concessions and continued disengagement.
The big difference is that, failing to make his case for decisive military action in Iraq, Bush--or a later president--has the option to remove the soldiers and bring the troops home.
That is a luxury that Israel does not have.
It is in my opinion the extremes that have caused this intractable situation with blame on both sides. The Beilins on one hand with the delusions, and Yigal Amir on the other hand by removing Rabin who might have been an anchor.
ReplyDeleteIn the run up to Oslo, I was fortunate enough as a very young student journalist / activist to meet with Rabin & Peres in Canada.
Rabin was all fluff and dreams on TV, but in person to us as a small group he was a total cynic on Oslo. Which I opposed vehemently incidentally. Had he survived I think the farce that was Oslo would have been more mitigated, I think he would have reversed the course earlier, and more importantly he would have had the legitimacy to reverse it.
The concept of Israeli deterence would not have evaporated as it did like the night time fleeing from Lebanon. When he was removed it is my opinion the cynic at the center / left was removed with him, and the spiral of the left went totally unchecked even though bibi was in power. The rise of the delusion took hold internationally with the Clinton / Bibi conflict of wills, in that vacuum the radical left gained legitimacy and power in Israel and abroad with Clinton desperately seeking his legacy throwing all caution & reason to the wind.
This may not be a popular sweeping notion I have posted, but I do not forget that Rabin was also the guy that said to the IDF, if they resist you.. break their bones with your batons. For the record I was not a Rabin supporter / cheerleader, his assasination galvanized the left in a way non could ever fathom, it gave them legitimacy they never earned via their policies, that is the most dangerous legitimacy possible, built on farce.
This Oslo syndrome may in my opinion have direct correlation with the actions of the right, or as you posted in Bush's regard, the now inaction of the right in the USA re Iraq.
(I did not mean to bombard your post with this long comment, apologies!)
I wrote a post last year on Rabin's legacy vis-a-vis Oslo: Fallout of the Rabin Assassination--Oslo
ReplyDeleteThe post quotes Joseph Schick: "...the assassination of Rabin that night galvanized the Israeli Left and marginalized the Right, particularly the religious Zionist sector and the Yesha movement. The notion took hold that any and all left-wing political stances – including those Rabin had rejected – had to be implemented to support Rabin's memory and legacy."
Later in the post:
Thus The Jewish Week on Octobe 28, 2005 wrties:
Rabin, the military man turned prime minister, endorsed the Oslo Accords with Yasir Arafat, pledging an independent state for the Palestinians in return for peace with Israel. Not true, writes Schick:
That is a widespread misperception. In fact, Rabin was always opposed to the formation of a Palestinian state, to any division of Jerusalem, or to any concessions on the Jordan Valley. His political red lines remained guided by the Allon Plan under which Israel would retain around thirty percent of Judea and Samaria.As proof, he points to a Knesset Speech Rabin gave on October 5, 1995. Here is the relevant part of that speech. An extended excerpt of it can be found at The Foundation for Middle East Peace. The parts of that speech that Schick points to are in bold:
We view the permanent solution in the framework of the State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six-Day War. We will not return to the June 4, 1967, lines.
The post concludes:
Meron Benevisti of Haaretz has some thoughts about that legacy and those who claim to have a share in it:
...there's no connection between the memory of Yitzhak Rabin or his action and the situation five years after his death. He left a double heritage - first, belief that only a gradual, incremental process would lead to conciliation and peace, and second, that mutual recognition of the legitimacy of two national movements fighting over the same homeland is the only ideological foundation on which to build a peace process.
Those who followed him betrayed that double legacy. Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon disavowed both, and Ehud Barak sought to hasten the end, and was punished. None of them can hide behind Rabin's broad back, and the memory of the murdered leader does not need to be a ball fought over in a political court.And, one might add--for those of a less sanguine view of Rabin's legacy--neither is there any point in besmirching the memory of what Rabin had honestly hoped to achieve.
Bottom line, Rabin's legacy will always remain uncertain--which is unfortunate.