He writes that part of the impetus on the Israeli side is due to new developments going on all around them in the Middle East:
The intifada and the global momentum of radical Islamism have brought home to the Israeli public and leadership that their state is threatened by four new and growing dangers: first, an altered security environment in which the principal threat is from groups with no defined geography and operating from small, mobile bases; second, the demographic challenge because the alternative to a two-state solution could become a single state in which the Jewish population turns into a minority; third, the existential threat of nuclear proliferation, especially from Iran; and finally, an international environment in which Israel finds itself increasingly isolated because of the growing perception in Western Europe and in small but influential circles in the United States that Israel's alleged intransigence is the cause of Arab hostility to the West.Part of the problem, of course, is to what degree going forward with a two-state solution is going to resolve these problems--and to what degree it will just whet the appetite once again of those who want to destroy Israel, and of those who are content to sit back and watch.
Kissinger breaks this down into some more specific questions:
The definition of a Palestinian partner has so far proved elusive. Gaza is governed by Hamas, which is unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of Israel, not to speak of the specific terms under negotiation. Who then takes responsibility for Gaza? And it is unclear how much of the West Bank population Abbas can speak for.But bottom line--Kissinger is still a diplomat, with a diplomat's confidence in the power of negotiation. This despite the fact that Abbas is trying to dictate terms as if he is the victor in a war.
Several Arab states have declared their willingness to recognize Israel once it returns to the 1967 borders. But recognition of the existence of a state has historically been treated as a factual, not a policy, matter. A key question, therefore, becomes exactly what is meant by "recognition." Will the moderate Arab states place pressure on Hamas to accept the premises of the peace process? Or will the fashionable pressure for "engagement" with Hamas turn into an alibi for evading that necessity?
Are the moderate Arab states prepared to expand and strengthen the small group committed to genuine co-existence? Will recognition of Israel bring an end to the unrelenting media, governmental and educational campaign in Arab countries that presents Israel as an illegitimate, imperialist, almost criminal interloper in the region?
Is all this nothing more than a retread of Nixon's concept of "an honorable end to the war" and "peace with honor" in Vietnam?
Remember what happened to South Vietnam? A Toronto Star editorial in 1973 on "peace with honor":
"Exit with face saved" would have been a more accurate phrase than peace with honor; for, whatever the terms of the Paris agreement may say, it's obvious that there is no guarantee of peace between North and South Viet Nam. Hanoi maintains its goal of unifying all Viet Nam under Communist rule, while the government of South Viet Nam and a considerable number of its people mean to resist that dubious blessing.Some things don't change.
Technorati Tag: Henry Kissinger.
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