Barry Rubin: Egypt: The Mubarak Resignation-- He Did It His Way--And Its Consequences

This post was written by Barry Rubin and is reposted here with his permission.

Egypt: The Mubarak Resignation--
He Did It His Way--And Its Consequences

By Barry Rubin

In a move that simultaneously caught the world by surprise and yet indicated the regime's strategy, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak announced his resignation the day after refusing to resign.

It is impossible to believe that the military, to whom Mubarak handed power, changed its mind and plan in the last 24 hours due to continued demonstrations that it made no attempt to stop. So what is going on?


It is possible that Mubarak went beyond the agreement he had made with the army on what he was going to say in his speech. But that also seems unlikely.

What is most probable is that this was all agreed upon in advance: Mubarak retained his dignity and can say (though few care) that he quit on his own terms. Perhaps, then, Obama's jubilation yesterday might have been a premature expression of what he knew was going to happen.

So Mubarak is gone. The first point is that while this is huge in psychological terms, it is less important in strategic terms. Either health or the end of his term in September would have taken the 82-year-old president out of office soon any way.

The immediate effect is to set off celebrations throughtout Egypt. On one hand, this benefits the regime, which has now removed its most hated symbol. On the other hand, since the revolutionary movement can take credit for Mubarak's fall it is going to be seen as gathering momentum.

So now the regime faces the opposition. What is it going to offer? If the terms laid out in Mubarak's speech still prevail, the answer is not very much.

Or will it go back to its original offer of parliamentary elections, a convention to draw up a new constitution, and then presidential elections? Is the military ready to go out of the governing business and make a deal with the opposition in order to preserve its own privileges?

Here are the issues to watch:

--Will there be talk about dissolving the parliament and holding new parliamentary elections?

--Will the regime seek a new constitution?

--According to the existing constitution there must be an election within sixty days. Is this going to happen?

--Will the demonstrations die down now that Mubarak is gone or will the pressure be kept up?

--Will the army, seeking popularity, continue to avoid interfering against demonstrations, or perhaps to limit them mainly to Tahrir Square?

--Who will run for president? The Muslim Brotherhood will not run by itself but will support Muhammad ElBardei. What opposition will there be to him, if any? Given the short time available, would anyone be able to organize a party except for the ElBardei-Brotherhood coalition?

If that last point is true, then we have to go back to all of our previous discussion regarding Egypt's future. For, after all, if ElBardei is going to be president, the army doesn't object, and his main ally is the Muslim Brotherhood, the next government is likely to be a coalition that gives it an important (but not necessarily prominent) role.

There will be much cheering but one should remember the following facts:

--El Bardei is totally untested and has no prior political or governing experience.

--His views are relatively radical as will be his colleagues on foreign policy. There is an interesting question about how grateful he would be to Obama, to whom perhaps he feels he partly would owe his position. That might be a mitigating factor.

--Note that Obama said that the United States would do everything possible to help a democratic Egypt. Is he going to propose an international aid consortium or raise current levels of U.S. aid? Given the economic situation that is hard to believe.

--It will be interesting to watch the reactions of Iran and of Arab governments to the new regime, if there's going to be one. Will Iran and Syria be enthusiastic--which would be the smarter move--or reserved, viewing ElBardei as an American puppet. The Saudis and Jordanians will be nervous, wondering whether ElBardei would support regime change in their countries. The Jordanians have the additional concern since their main opponent at home is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, ally of one of ElBaradei's main supporters.

--What would the new regime do on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border? One might speculate that they would open the border--a tremendously popular move in Egypt--and insist to the United States that the Egyptian army will keep out weapons. I don't believe this. Hamas, too, will be celebrating. In a sense, Hamas would have the ability to create a major regional crisis by attacking Israel since it can presume a degree of Egyptian support.

--As for Israel it would seek normal relations with the new government. How would ElBaradei treat the peace treaty? Under tremendous American pressure, he would see no need to tear it up formally. For a time at least the Brotherhood would agree to just let it be a dead letter. How would the current gas sales be treated? Perhaps they would just continue or, perhaps, the line would just be conveniently sabotaged enough so that no more gas would be sold.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, to be published by Yale University Press later this year. You can read more of Barry Rubin's posts at Rubin Reports.

Technorati Tag: Egypt and Mubarak.