The Danish Cartoons and the Hijacking of Islam

Yesterday, I quoted a piece from Iraq the Model, who made 2 points:

I give up! I have to comment on the general situation…
I swear that 90%+ of the protestors in Muslim countries have not seen the cartoons and do not know the name of the paper and when I say that I'm sure of it because I have access to the web 24/7 and I spent a really long time searching for the cartoons and couldn’t find them until a friend emailed me a link and.

You know that those cartoons were published for the 1st time months ago and we here in the Middle East have tonnes of jokes about Allah, the prophets and the angels that are way more offensive, funny and obscene than those poorly-made cartoons, yet no one ever got shot for telling one of those jokes or at least we had never seen rallies and protests against those infidel joke-tellers.

Today, Amir Taheri has some similar thoughts in his article in the Wall Street Journal: Bonfire of the Pieties--Islam prohibits neither images of Muhammad nor jokes about religion Taheri writes:

But how representative of Islam are all those demonstrators? The "rage machine" was set in motion when the Muslim Brotherhood--a political, not a religious, organization--called on sympathizers in the Middle East and Europe to take the field. A fatwa was issued by Yussuf al-Qaradawi, a Brotherhood sheikh with his own program on al-Jazeera. Not to be left behind, the Brotherhood's rivals, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) and the Movement of the Exiles (Ghuraba), joined the fray. Believing that there might be something in it for themselves, the Syrian Baathist leaders abandoned their party's 60-year-old secular pretensions and organized attacks on the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus and Beirut.

The Muslim Brotherhood's position, put by one of its younger militants, Tariq Ramadan--who is, strangely enough, also an adviser to the British home secretary--can be summed up as follows: It is against Islamic principles to represent by imagery not only Muhammad but all the prophets of Islam; and the Muslim world is not used to laughing at religion. Both claims, however, are false.

The issue of whether Islam allows for the image of Mohammed to be depicted is easy enough to settle by going to the Mohammed Image Archive.

Andy McCarthy at The Corner takes issue with Taheri's distinction that would describe the Moslem Brotherhood as "a political, not a religious, organization." He writes:

...I have to confess that I am tempted to tune out instantly when someone stresses that the Muslim Brotherhood is a "political, not a religious" organization -- as if there were in Islam an analogy to the Western sense the the religious and political spheres are severable. I find it especially difficult to take when we then get to the very next sentence, wherein Taheri explains: "A fatwa was issued by Yussuf al-Qaradawi, a Brotherhood sheikh with his own program on al-Jazeera." Well, I'll be darned, a politcal-not-a-religious organization that happens to have its own in-house sheikhs.

Perhaps Taheri's response to McCarthy comes later when Taheri addresses the issue--which is not a usual topic of conversation these days, for obvious reasons--of the Moslem sense of humor:

Now to the second claim, that the Muslim world is not used to laughing at religion. That is true if we restrict the Muslim world to the Brotherhood and its siblings in the Salafist movement, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda. But these are all political organizations masquerading as religious ones. They are not the sole representatives of Islam, just as the Nazi Party was not the sole representative of German culture. Their attempt at portraying Islam as a sullen culture that lacks a sense of humor is part of the same discourse that claims "suicide martyrdom" as the highest goal for all true believers. [emphasis added]

Taheri has already opened the door to the external influences upon Islam when he writes about how the proscription against depicting Mohammed came about:

There is no Quranic injunction against images, whether of Muhammad or anyone else. When it spread into the Levant, Islam came into contact with a version of Christianity that was militantly iconoclastic. As a result some Muslim theologians, at a time when Islam still had an organic theology, issued "fatwas" against any depiction of the Godhead.

Taheri's comment about when Islam 'still' had an organic theology implies that things have changed and that Islam is not impervious to foreign influence.

Bernard Lewis, in The Crisis of Islam, writes about the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and along with it the Ottoman sultanate:

The Ottoman sovereign was not only a sultan, the ruler of a specific state; he was also widely recognized as the caliph, the head of all Sunni Islam, and the last in a line of rulers that dated back to the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 C.E. and the appointment of a successor to take his place, not as a spiritual but as religious and political head of the Muslim state and community...

During its nearly thirteen centuries, the caliphate had gone through many vicissitudes, but it remained a potent symbol of Muslim unity, even identity; its disappearance, under the double assault of foreign imperialists and domestic modernists, was felt throughout the Muslim world...Many Muslims are still painfully conscious of this void...

...For most of the history of the institution, the holder of the caliphate contented themselves with the more modest title Amir al-Mu'minin, usually translated as "Commander of the Faithful." (p. xii-xiii)

The lack of such key leadership might explain the loss of an "organic theology" that Taheri hinted at; the ability of political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafist movement, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda to portray themselves as religious groups; the bifurcation between politics and religion that McCarthy mentions should not exist; and the domination of extremist groups within Islam.

Later in his book, Lewis writes:

There are several forms of Islamic extremism current at the present time. The best known are the subversive radicalism of Al-Qa'ida and other groups that resemble it all over the Muslim world; the preemptive fundamentalism of the Saudi establishment; and the institutionalized revolution of the ruling Iranian hierarchy. All of these are, in a sense, Islamic in origin, but some of them have deviated very far from their origins.

All these different extremist groups sanctify their action through pious references to Islamic texts, notably the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, and all three claim to represent a truer, purer, and more authentic Islam than that currently practiced by the vast majority of Muslims and endorsed by most though not all of the religious leadership. They are, however, highly selective in their choice and interpretation of sacred texts. (p. 138)

There have always been more extreme groups within religion, but would the current vying for 'Islamic purity' be possible if the complete infrastructure--including the caliphate--was intact?

As an example of how the extremists are not merely pushing for the more extreme laws but are actually being 'selective' in their interpretation, Lewis offers the case of Salman Rushdie, when the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, offering a bounty for the one who killed the author of the Satanic Verses.

Lewis notes that at the time, people may have misinterpreted what a fatwa was, thinking it was the Islamic equivalent of 'putting out a contract'. On the contrary:

Fatwa is a technical term in Islamic jurisprudence for a legal opinion or ruling on a point of law...The Islamic jurisconsult who is authorized to issue a fatwa is called a mufti, an active participle from the same root. In using a fatwa to pronounce a death sentence and recruit an assassin, the ayatollah was deviating very considerably from standard Islamic practice. (p. 140)

Needless to say, the Ayatollah was likely creating a precedent for selective interpretation as well.

Interestingly--and this may tie in with the issue of the 12 Danish cartoons--'Insulting the Prophet', which was the general charge brought against Rushdie, is punishable by flogging and imprisonment. This is not the impression you get by reading the signs at the riots which call for death, beheading, and extermination.

In the case of Rushdie, as a Moslem his supposed crime would be apostasy--but according to Islamic law a trial by judge is required. While a minority opinion says that the crime is so great that a formal trial is not needed, some sort of procedure or authorization is required, without which the execution is itself murder--and punishable as such. As for another opinion that says the immediate execution is obligatory and one who does not so is himself committing an offense, Lewis points out:

Even the most rigorous and extreme of the classical jurists only require a Muslim to kill anyone who insults the Prophet in his hearing and in his presence. They say nothing about a hired killing for a reported insult in a distant country.

Clearly, the extremists who are in control--are out of control.

Getting back to the original topic of Muslim humor, Taheri writes:

The truth is that Islam has always had a sense of humor and has never called for chopping heads as the answer to satirists. Muhammad himself pardoned a famous Meccan poet who had lampooned him for more than a decade. Both Arabic and Persian literature, the two great literatures of Islam, are full of examples of "laughing at religion," at times to the point of irreverence. Again, offering an exhaustive list is not possible. But those familiar with Islam's literature know of Ubaid Zakani's "Mush va Gorbeh" (Mouse and Cat), a match for Rabelais when it comes to mocking religion. Sa'adi's eloquent soliloquy on behalf of Satan mocks the "dry pious ones." And Attar portrays a hypocritical sheikh who, having fallen into the Tigris, is choked by his enormous beard. Islamic satire reaches its heights in Rumi, where a shepherd conspires with God to pull a stunt on Moses; all three end up having a good laugh.

As if to emphasize the point, Rantings of a Sandmonkey has scans showing that the 12 Danish cartoons were published in an Egyptian newspaper during Ramadan with no riots. He writes:

Freedom For Egyptians reminded me why the cartoons looked so familiar to me: they were actually printed in the Egyptian Newspaper Al Fagr back in October 2005. I repeat, October 2005, during Ramadan, for all the egyptian muslim population to see, and not a single squeak of outrage was present. Al Fagr isn't a small newspaper either: it has respectable circulation in Egypt, since it's helmed by known Journalist Adel Hamoudah. Looking around in my house I found the copy of the newspaper, so I decided to scan it and present to all of you to see.

Freedom for Egyptians points out:

It would have been better that this holy war against Denmark be launched during the holy month of Ramadan as many Muslims believe that Jihad during Ramadan would have been more worthy.

And yet the riots did not happen till 5 months later.

Laurence J. Peter once wrote:

An individual is as strong as his or her prejudice. Two things reduce prejudice--education and laughter.

The extremists who would guide Islam in the 21st century would seem to be opposed to both.

Crossposted at Israpundit

Other posts here on the topic of the Danish cartoons:

o The Denmark Cartoons and Moslem Moderation 2/15/06
o The Timing of the Danish Cartoon Riots 2/8/06
o Comparing the Danish Cartoons to Der Sturmer? 2/7/06
o Translation of the Danish Moslem Delegation Letter 2/6/06
o The Anti-Denmark Riots: Has Pallywood Gone Global? 2/5/06
o Cartoon Irony 2/5/06
o Denmark and the Cartoon Defense 2/2/06

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