According to Caroline Glick, the operation is just Sound and Fury Signifying Incompetence.
A different, more optimistic view comes from Ron Ben-Yishai at YNet. He sees 4 distinct accomplishments from the operation [with my comments]:
First, it created a new erosion equation that would force Hamas to think twice before its next Qassam offensive. It was completely clear that this morning Hamas would fire several rockets at Ashkelon and the western Negev, just to show that the Israeli operation achieved nothing. Yet the operation’s true effect can only be measured over time, when the effect of “Warm Winter” along with other operations of this type would form a critical mass that would erode the power of Gaza gunmen.
Hamas lost about 70 men in three days, and that’s a lot – even for a group that sanctifies death. It would be improper to use the term “balance of terror” in this context, because none of the sides – either us or Hamas – feel any terror, but rather, a desire to lower the casualty toll. [How many men did Hamas lose in fighting with Fatah? Has that made Hamas any more wary of fighting Fatah?]
The second achievement: The operation erodes Hamas’ status in the eyes of residents of the Strip. It doesn’t matter how often Hamas spokesmen repeat the mantra “the people is behind us,” phone conversations with Gaza residents create a wholly different impression. [But is the impression that there is dissatisfaction--of which there is plenty, or real revolt?]
The third achievement: The operation creates legitimacy among the international community to a situation of fighting in Gaza. This legitimacy is also created as a result of the fact that the media no longer view fighting in Gaza as “news,” and also because the ongoing attacks on Ashkelon make it clear that Israel did not pounce on the Palestinians for no reason. A testament to this legitimacy could be seen in the fact that no real pressure was exerted on Israel to end the operation on the part of official political elements, including in the Arab world. [Weren't we making the same claim at one point 2 years ago in the war with Hizbollah?]
The operation’s fourth achievement was nicely defined by Haim Kuznitz, when we drank our coffee after the second Qassam landed Monday morning. “We are willing to sustain the Qassams when it’s clear to us that the IDF is fighting those who fire them,” Haim said. “What I couldn’t bear was the sense of humiliation when we sustained but did nothing.” [How many residents of Sderot share that willingness?]
Even Ben-Yishai admits that there are negatives--but he points out only one:
Hamas is learning the IDF’s combat tactics, and the military leadership there also makes assessments and draws lessons, while improving its deployment accordingly.Maybe--but that is the result of any military operation, isn't it? After all, Ben-Yishai himself wrote in a separate piece:
Sources from within the Givati Infantry Brigade said that its soldiers that participated in the Warm Winter operation in Gaza implemented a considerable amount of the lessons learned in the Second Lebanon War.Is this the only drawback that he could find to the current operation--what about the impression made by Israel's early withdrawal from Gaza, along with the declaration of clear goals to compare against?
Officers in the brigade spoke about a combination of complex and sophisticated urban warfare and fighting principles such as commitment to the mission and pushing for contact with the enemy that stood out among the soldiers and commanders.
Either way, unless Israel follows up with more of the same, who can doubt that Hamas will be seen as the victor--and rightfully so.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad
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