Do All Roads Lead To Recognition Of Hamas?

I was reading with interest Yossi Alpher of Bitter Lemons, who was explaining at length why a unity government of Hamas and Fatah was a bad idea in that it would strengthen Hamas.

Alpher goes on to counter the arguments of those who claim that as a result of such a coalition, the extremism of Hamas would be tempered:

Some argue that Hamas would have to accept the Quartet's three preconditions of renouncing terrorism, accepting past agreements and recognizing Israel. It would have to agree that Fateh, meaning the PA as currently configured, administer the Gaza crossings and the extensive reconstruction aid being discussed by the international community at Sharm al-Sheikh and elsewhere.

There are three problems with these calculations: big, bigger and biggest. The big problem is that Fateh is relatively weak and Hamas strong politically. It's clear who will be negotiating from a position of strength and how this will influence the outcome.

The bigger problem is that advocates of the two-state solution look at the map and argue that a unity government is the only way to save it. Otherwise, the West Bank and Fateh will remain under separate governments and evolve into separate political entities. To this contention the reply is simple: under current circumstances, better to maintain the components of a three-state solution, with Israel and the PLO negotiating over the West Bank and Hamas contained inside Gaza, than to install effective Hamas rule in the West Bank as well as Gaza--which would preclude any solution at all.

Finally, the biggest problem is that none of the principals--Israel, the Quartet, the PLO and Egypt--has a workable strategy for dealing with Hamas in Gaza. Military force has failed to weaken Hamas; so has economic warfare (closing the Israel-Gaza crossings). Indirect contacts via Egypt and others, where issues like linking a ceasefire to a prisoner exchange are discussed, have failed. Indeed, tying the future of Israel's relationship with the Gaza Strip to the fate of a single IDF soldier reflects a bankruptcy of new strategic ideas in Jerusalem. And the notion of linking direct contacts with concessions on the part of Hamas has also failed. Under these circumstances, wherein no one really understands what has to be done regarding Hamas, encouraging the formation of a unity government appears near suicidal, if only because the outcome is so fraught with danger and uncertainty.

So far, so good--but with that last objection, Alpher has been leading up to what he considers a better alternative:

Israel and the Quartet would be better off abandoning their preconditions, opening the passages--thereby virtually assuring a ceasefire--and offering to talk to Hamas about long-term coexistence, even as Israel and the PLO talk in parallel about a political solution. Hamas would still be considered a terrorist organization as long as it directs violence at civilians. But because it successfully controls finite Palestinian territory, it-unlike other terrorist organizations--cannot be ignored politically.

So instead of a coaltion that will merely be dominated by Hamas--it is better to deal with Hamas individually, thereby giving it more recognition and validation for everything that it has done up to this point?

And then comes the rest of the argument: Israel can strenghten the PA (through "Israel-PLO talks") which can then enter into a coaltion with Hamas! What is left unclear is why, once a political a political entity strong enough to enter with Hamas was created, Hamas would want to enter into such a relationship.

And if strengthening the PA does not work after having given Hamas recognition?

at least Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the West will know where they stand vis-a-vis the Islamists and can calculate what has to be done to secure the strategically-located West Bank.

Will they know any more then than they do now, or will they merely have further proof for what they already not suspect--only with an even stronger proxy of Iran next door?

Talking to Hamas--in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead--is apparently no less seductive, if not more so.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad

Technorati Tag: Israel and Hamas.