Mideast Media Sampler 09/18/2011

From DG:

1) Your concern is noted


In 1997 a "final status" map was leaked to the media. Given that then Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu had campaigned against Oslo, this would seem to have been a pretty big deal. In All Map, No Vision, Thomas Friedman wrote:

A huge tree fell in the forest of Israel the other day, and nobody heard it. And therein lies a story.

The falling tree was that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented to his Cabinet the rough map of what he would offer the Palestinians in final-status talks, if they ever happen. Although his map calls for Israel to retain control of Greater Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and a wide security belt of territory along the 1967 Green Line that encompasses Jewish settlements, all main highways and all sources of water, it would assign the rest -- a patchwork of roughly 40 percent of the West Bank -- to the Palestinians. Given Mr. Netanyahu's long opposition to territorial compromise, that was a pretty big tree to fall without so much as a ''Timbeeeeerrrrr.''
The muted reaction in Israel to Mr. Netanyahu's map tells you all you need to know about the peace process today. To begin with, it got so little attention because it was meant for local consumption. What motivated Mr. Netanyahu to come out with it now -- when there is no prospect of final-status talks -- was not to lure Yasir Arafat to the table. If that were his motivation, he would have shown it to Mr. Arafat, which he didn't.

This was just months after Netanyahu and his cabinet agreed to withdraw Israel from most of Hevron. But to Friedman, Netanyahu despite this concrete action, was doing nothing for peace.


Friedman's negativity prompted Martin Peretz to respond with "Off the map." (The New Republic July 7, 1997) (emphasis mine)

In his June 13 Washington Post column, Charles Krauthammer points out that--for all their obsessive coverage of Israel--the major American news media have ignored what may be the most important political development out of Jerusalem in years. This is Benjamin Netanyahu's decision, reported a few weeks ago in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, to pursue a "final settlement" that would hand over much of the West Bank to a Palestinian state. This is a transformatory abandonment of ideological principles by the Israeli right. It could set a new, and promising, framework for future negotiations--if people in American government and media take it seriously. How strange then that American editors--who recently devoted space to a story about interest among Israel's ultra-Orthodox in the messianic significance of a red heifer--have largely passed on the story.


My friend Tom Friedman, opining in The New York Times, answered Krauthammer's complaint, and agreed, in part. "A huge tree fell in the forest of Israel the other day, and nobody heard it," Tom wrote of the reception accorded to Netanyahu's plan. But Tom's reason for the odd silence is the usual reason--it is Netanyahu's fault: "the main reason Mr. Netanyahu's map was spurned by the Arabs was that it was totally unconnected to what he's doing on the ground." I see a different reason: I think the main reason Netanyahu's map was spurned by the Arabs is that the Arabs know they can count on attitudes like Tom's to prevail in the American press. They can count on a press that deeply dislikes Netanyahu to dismiss even a substantive proposal from him as cynical posturing.

Today, Thomas Friedman, in advance of the Palestinian Authority's effort to declare statehood unilaterally, weighs in with Israel: Adrift at Sea Alone:

I'VE never been more worried about Israel's future. The crumbling of key pillars of Israel's security — the peace with Egypt, the stability of Syria and the friendship of Turkey and Jordan — coupled with the most diplomatically inept and strategically incompetent government in Israel's history have put Israel in a very dangerous situation.

This has also left the U.S. government fed up with Israel's leadership but a hostage to its ineptitude, because the powerful pro-Israel lobby in an election season can force the administration to defend Israel at the U.N., even when it knows Israel is pursuing policies not in its own interest or America's. 

The first sentence is a weak attempt at the "more in sorrow than in anger" tone that former anti-Israel columnist Anthony Lewis perfected. And that second paragraph might as well have been written by Walt and Mearsheimer. Damn those Jews, they're keeping Obama from doing the right thing!

Israel is not responsible for the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt or for the uprising in Syria or for Turkey's decision to seek regional leadership by cynically trashing Israel or for the fracturing of the Palestinian national movement between the West Bank and Gaza. What Israel's prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu, is responsible for is failing to put forth a strategy to respond to all of these in a way that protects Israel's long-term interests.
O.K., Mr. Netanyahu has a strategy: Do nothing vis-à-vis the Palestinians or Turkey that will require him to go against his base, compromise his ideology or antagonize his key coalition partner, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, an extreme right-winger. Then, call on the U.S. to stop Iran's nuclear program and help Israel out of every pickle, but make sure that President Obama can't ask for anything in return — like halting Israeli settlements — by mobilizing Republicans in Congress to box in Obama and by encouraging Jewish leaders to suggest that Obama is hostile to Israel and is losing the Jewish vote. And meanwhile, get the Israel lobby to hammer anyone in the administration or Congress who says aloud that maybe Bibi has made some mistakes, not just Barack. There, who says Mr. Netanyahu doesn't have a strategy?

Friedman is, of course, correct. Netanyahu is doing nothing. It's not ideological though. There is nothing Israel can do that will help it. And whether he remembers it or not, or just doesn't care, Netanyahu did agree to a settlement freeze just last year in response to prodding from President Obama and it didn't bring Abbas to the table to negotiate seriously. And it isn't Jewish leaders acting at the behest of Netanyahu who believe that Obama is hostile or at least unsympathetic to Israel, pro-Israel Americans (among them Jews) are drawing that conclusion on their own.


Unlike many others who explain all the problems Israel is facing and then blame Netanyahu, Friedman actually has a suggestion:

What could Israel have done? The Palestinian Authority, which has made concrete strides in the past five years at building the institutions and security forces of a state in the West Bank — making life there quieter than ever for Israel — finally said to itself: "Our state-building has not prompted Israel to halt settlements or engage in steps to separate, so all we're doing is sustaining Israel's occupation. Let's go to the U.N., get recognized as a state within the 1967 borders and fight Israel that way." Once this was clear, Israel should have either put out its own peace plan or tried to shape the U.N. diplomacy with its own resolution that reaffirmed the right of both the Palestinian and the Jewish people to a state in historic Palestine and reignited negotiations. 

Interesting that Friedman echoes something that Shibley Telhami wrote last week in the Washington Post -  Telhami's suggestion was for an America resolution not an Israel one. Friedman leaves out a lot here. Yes the PA has made some strides. But there are doubts as to how effective they'd be if challenged by Hamas. And while the economy of the PA has generally been growing, it is mostly dependent on government jobs - not the private sector so it is vulnerable to cutoff of foreign aid. But what in the world does Friedman mean by "the right of both the Palestinian and the Jewish people to a state in historic Palestine?" Has he given up on two states for two people? And his reference to "historic" Palestine is thoroughly dishonest.

Mr. Netanyahu did neither. Now the U.S. is scrambling to defuse the crisis, so the U.S. does not have to cast a U.N. veto on a Palestinian state, which could be disastrous in an Arab world increasingly moving toward more popular self-rule.

Is the Arab world really moving more toward "popular self-rule" or simply toward getting rid of old tyrants?

With his consolidation of power and efforts to enrich friends and family, Mahmoud Abbas seems more like the Mubarak of the peace process than Netanyahu (an epithet Friedman has used occasionally).

Of course the Obama administration would not have to defuse anything if it had taken decisive action earlier. Friedman is a big fan of the first Bush administration. What did the administration of George H. W. Bush do when the Palestinians threatened a unilateral declaration of state in 1989? Secretary of State, Jame Baker - no friend of Israel - threatened that the administration would cut off funding to any UN organization that accepted a PLO state.


Last week's "speed dial" story highlighted another element of the administration, that brought us to this point. The administration signaled that it would do more for the Palestinians than it actually did. As Jackson Diehl observed in May 2009, Abbas felt that with the advent of the Obama administration he needed to do nothing for peace.

On Turkey, the Obama team and Mr. Netanyahu's lawyers worked tirelessly these last two months to resolve the crisis stemming from the killing by Israeli commandos of Turkish civilians in the May 2010 Turkish aid flotilla that recklessly tried to land in Gaza. Turkey was demanding an apology. According to an exhaustive article about the talks by the Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea of the Yediot Aharonot newspaper, the two sides agreed that Israel would apologize only for "operational mistakes" and the Turks would agree to not raise legal claims. Bibi then undercut his own lawyers and rejected the deal, out of national pride and fear that Mr. Lieberman would use it against him. So Turkey threw out the Israeli ambassador.

Actually there was a cabinet vote, and the result of that was not to apologize. That's what we usually refer to as politics or democracy, Friedman attributes it to "national pride and fear." That's because he doesn't like the result. Michael Rubin explained why the apology would have been a bad idea:

If Israel apologizes to Turkey, it will compound its problems. Just as President Eisenhower's decision to side with Gamal Abdul Nasser after he nationalized the Suez Canal emboldened the populist leader's ambitions, so too will Israel's apology empower Erdoğan. Not only will it solidify his reputation among Israel's enemies, but it will only embolden Erdoğan to up his demands from Israel and from other states. Just in the last few days, not only has Erdoğan declared that he will not normalize relations with Israel until its ends is blockage of Hamas, but he has also begun demanding apologies from Armenia as well. Nor will an apology solve any legal problems facing Israeli soldiers who took part in the raid on the Mavi Marmara. Erdoğan may say that Turkey will not sue the soldiers, but if precedent is any indication, he will claim that he cannot speak for the families of the extremists killed onboard.
Israel has an enemy. Alas, it is less Erdoğan than its repeated belief that appeasement works. If Israel wants to defend itself and improve its security, position, and respect in the world, it's time to tell Turkey, "enough."

Friedman may assume that an apology would help, but history shows that appeasing tyrants only emboldens them.

As for Egypt, stability has left the building there and any new Egyptian government is going to be subjected to more populist pressures on Israel. Some of this is unavoidable, but why not have a strategy to minimize it by Israel putting a real peace map on the table?

More populist pressure on Israel? Shouldn't the fear be that regardless of what Israel does the Muslim Brotherhood, which rejects Israel's existence will be more influential in the next government? Doesn't the attack on Israel's embassy - in defiance of international norms -signal that there is little Israel can do right now? Does he really believe that an Israeli "peace map" would change things?

I have great sympathy for Israel's strategic dilemma and no illusions about its enemies. But Israel today is giving its friends — and President Obama's one of them — nothing to defend it with. Israel can fight with everyone or it can choose not to surrender but to blunt these trends with a peace overture that fair-minded people would recognize as serious, and thereby reduce its isolation.

Actually the bulk of the column proved just the opposite. Friedman has no sympathy for Israel's strategic dilemmas and plenty of illusions about its enemies. And the problem here isn't Israel, it is people like Friedman - in journalism, politics and academia - who refuse to judge Israel's enemies and allow their visceral hatred of Binyamin Netanyahu to dictate their analyses.


Noticeably missing from his op-ed is any reference to Fayyadism, Friedman's great hope for peace. That's because Salam Fayyad has been isolated by Mahmoud Abbas. (Fayyad also has no real power base.) In other cases Friedman's shown no compunction to rewrite history, but I guess his shamelessness ends when his own pet neologism is discredited by events.


2) Reich responds


Selected responses to Seymour Reich's letter were published today, along with Reich's response. The letters by David Harris of the AJC and a private citizen, David Frifield were excellent. Reich's response to Harris included this:

I agree that Hamas “cannot be overlooked.” But, if the Palestinian Authority’s president, Mahmoud Abbas, fails, Hamas wins. If an agreement between Mr. Abbas and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reached, Hamas loses. 

Funny, but Reich ignores one possibility - that actually happened - who loses if Fatah unites with Hamas? The silliness of Reich's first letter is in no way mitigated by his response today.


Reich also basks in the self-congratulations of writer Stephen Fraade, a professor of Jewish studies at Yale who writes:

It is good news for the vitality of the American Jewish community that someone of Mr. Reich’s stature can publicly speak such uncomfortable truths.

As if it's that difficult to criticize Israel in the pages of the New York Times. Fraade and Reich mercifully leave out adjectives like "brave" and "courageous." In the opinion pages of the New York Times it takes courage to defend Israel. Of course, when such voices - like Thomas Friedman's - are  used to excuse the real culprits, it makes peace and justice less attainable.

3) Solana's yes


Javier Solana has co-written an op-ed Ten Reasons for a European 'Yes'


I'll just take reasons 2 and 3.

The second reason for a European "yes" is that the Europeans have already invested hugely in the two-state solution that is under scrutiny, including the annual €1 billion aid to help build a functioning Palestinian state. Again, a "yes" is a reaffirmation that the project is worthwhile and can succeed.
The third reason for a "yes" is simply to respond positively to Mahmoud Abbas' state-building achievements. Failing to vote "yes" would be to respond to demands for state-building by refusing to formally acknowledge where they have got to.

Why doesn't he mention that Abbas pushed for (and got) a unity deal with Hamas? But what achievements can Abbas really point to? That he is not Arafat? That he has provided for his family and friends and is as corrupt as Mubarak?


But Solana is too modest. Dan Diker pointed out in January 2010 that Solana is behind this unilateral declaration of independence.

The Palestinian leadership did not adopt the unilateral "Kosovo strategy" ex nihilo. Leading members of the European Union encouraged the Palestinians to move in this direction. PA chief negotiator Saeb Erekat credited former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana with engineering the idea.²⁸ In July 2009, Solana told a British forum that after a fixed deadline, the UN Security Council should unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines.²⁹ Palestinian unilateralism also received a boost in early December 2009 when Sweden, in the final thirty days of its rotating EU presidency, proposed that EU foreign ministers back its draft proposal recognizing east Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state, thus implying EU acceptance of a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood.³⁰

The EU Foreign Policy Council partly softened its final statement days later. However, as former UN ambassador Dore Gold notes, the final EU statement still retained the proposal that envisioned Jerusalem as the future capital of two states. Additionally, the statement said that the EU "would not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem," thereby enshrining the 1967 lines - a key Palestinian demand - as a previous political border.³¹ Palestinian unilateralism has also drawn encouragement from the United Nations itself. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has reportedly issued expressions of support for such moves, according to former PA security chief Mohammed Dahlan and Saeb Erekat in a November 14, 2009, interview with the Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam.³²

The UDI then is a joint venture of Palestinians and Europeans striving for relevancy. There is nothing noble in this effort. (The goal of delegitimizing Israel was explicitly spelled out in a Mahmoud Abbas op-ed in the New York Times back in May.) Friedman and others may complain that Israel isn't doing enough to defuse this effort, but instead they reveal their bias when they refuse to expose and condemn the machinations that are making this diplomatic initiative possible.