Monday, July 25, 2011

Hamas And The Salafists: When Terrorists Are Terrorized

[R]ecent events, including the kidnapping and killing of an Italian activist by a local Salafist cell and the Salafists’ repeated defiance of Hamas’ restrictions on rocket fire against Israel, have highlighted the
precarious and tense state of relations between the Hamas government and the violent Salafist groups operating within the Strip.
Benedetta Berti, Hamas’ Internal Challenge: The Political and Ideological Impact of Violent Salafist Groups in Gaza


I suppose it is difficult to feel any sympathy for Hamas and their problems with the Salafists--but I just can't help feeling there must be a Yiddish expression that sums up the whole thing.

While the Salafists are normally peaceful, during the past 6 years or so, new Salafist cells have emerged that are anything but:

This attitude has been effectively summarized by Kata’ib al-Tawhid’s leader Abu Abdhallah, who stated that his group aims “to From a purely military overthrow Hamas and set up an Islamic caliphate perspective, Salafist in the Gaza Strip.”...These groups believe that Hamas should not have engaged in the secular Palestinian political system and participated in the 2006 elections, and that since then the movement has gradually lost its Islamic character. Internally, they believe that Hamas is not doing enough to “Islamize” the Palestinian society within Gaza, and they are highly dissatisfied with the record of this Islamic organization with respect to both imposing sharia law and moving towards the creation of an Islamic government. Similarly, the Salafist-jihadist movement is highly critical of Hamas’ temporary hiatus in its open confrontation of the State of Israel, and their members accuse the organization of excess moderation. For their part, Palestinian jihadists openly and directly purse a strategy of jihad against the Jewish state. [emphasis added]
That's right: these Salafists think that Hamas is too moderate. Instead, they want to join up with other violent groups, and identify with al Qaeda--not that they have formed those links yet.

It was a Salafist group--Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam)--that together with the Hamas Qassam Brigades and the Salah al-Din Brigades, kidnapped Gilad Shalit. They also planned the kidnapping of BBC correspondent Alan Johnston in 2007--possibly to embarrass Hamas.

Similarly, another Salafist group, the Jaish al-Ummah (Army of the Nation), founded in 2007 continues to fire rockets at Israel, even when Hamas issues one of its "ceasefires".

There is also Jaljalat (Rolling Thunder), a group of loosely affiliated cells which have attacked local internet cafes in Gaza, and claimed responsibility for bombing the house of Dr Marwan Abu-Ras, a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council--and for the bombing Hamas’ security buildings.

Then there is what may be the most well-known case to date:
Another recent episode that further confirms the presence of the Gaza-based violent Salafist clusters was the recent kidnapping and killing of an international worker of Italian nationality in April 2011. The group that claimed responsibility for abducting Vittorio Arrigoni, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, initially asked for the release of one of the group’s leaders – detained by Hamas in March 201137 – but it then clumsily killed the hostage before the negotiations with Hamas proceeded. In the Arrigoni case, Hamas reacted by promptly identifying and killing those responsible for the kidnapping, sending a strong message to the local jihadists cells.
The Salafists currently are not a real threat to Hamas per se, but their ideology is a challenge to Hamas and they have been drawing members of Hamas to their cause--and of course, by acting as loose cannons in firing rockets against Israel, they disrupt the long range plans of Hamas. Hamas, in turn, has cracked down on these groups.

Berti concludes that:
the Salafist threat within Gaza enhances the dilemma that Hamas has been experiencing since its electoral victory in 2006: how to accommodate the pragmatic needs of governing Gaza and gaining international status and recognition while still preserving its core ideological premises and the support of its more radical constituency. Finding a balance between these two imperatives appears even more complicated in light of the pressure exerted by the radical factions within Gaza.
"Balance" is hardly a word I would associate with the Hamas terrorist group--but at the very least, maybe the Salafists will keep Hamas occupied and off-guard enough to prevent them from pursuing some of their own terrorist attacks.


Technorati Tag: and .

No comments: