Israel did not violate the laws of war and made marked improvements in its fighting capability during the recent military operation against Hamas in Gaza, yet the gains from the conflict in the long term remain uncertain, a US study concludes.Aside from the issue of compliance with International Law, the rest is fairly obvious to those following the news. Especially the conclusion, unfortunately.
The analysis of the 22-day conflict in Gaza by Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies finds "impressive improvements in the readiness and capability" of the Israeli Defense Forces since the war against Hizbullah in Lebanon in 2006, and unequivocally states that Israel did not violate the laws of war despite the large number of civilian casualties among the Palestinians.
"[Israel] did deliberately use decisive force to enhance regional deterrence and demonstrate that it had restored its military edge," the report states. "These, however, are legitimate military objectives in spite of their very real humanitarian costs."
Nearly 1,300 Palestinians were killed in the operation, including hundreds of civilians, according to Palestinian officials in Gaza.
The analysis finds that the IDF did not succeed in deterring Hamas from new rocket strikes on Israel or make "definitive changes in the political and military situation in Gaza," noting that the post-conflict situation looks strikingly like the situation before the fighting began.
Sporadic Palestinian rockets attacks against Israel have continued since the January 18 unilateral cease-fire declaration.
The report finds that while the success of the IDF military operation may have enhanced some aspects of Israel's military edge and ability to deter further attacks, it also did much to provoke reactions built on the anger caused by both the steadily deteriorating situation of the Palestinians and the impact of civilian casualties and collateral damage.
"The end result is that it is far from certain that Israel's tactical successes achieved significant strategic and grand strategic benefits," the report concludes.
Here is the synopsis of the report:
SYNOPSIS:Read the full report.
One can argue whether the fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza is a "war," or should be seen as just one more tragic surge in violence in the decades-long struggle between Israel and the Palestinians. It is, however, the first major armed struggle between Israel and Hamas, as distinguished from conflicts between Israel and the PLO and Fatah. It also is a case study in how Israeli capabilities have changed since the fighting with Hezbollah in 2006, and in the nature of asymmetric war between states and non-state actors.
Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, has prepared a detailed analysis of the military, strategic, and grand strategic dimensions of the war and its immediate aftermath. The report is entitled The "Gaza War": A Strategic Analysis, and is available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org//media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf
The report draws heavily on briefings given in Israeli during and immediately after the fighting which were made possible by a visit sponsored by Project Interchange, day-to-day reporting issued by the Israeli Defense Spokesman, and interviews with Arab officials and experts before and after the conflict. It examines the war in terms of the fighting, what it says about the changes in Israeli tactics and capabilities and the broader lessons it may provide for asymmetric warfare, and the strategic and grand strategic outcome of the fighting.
The report analyzes Arab views and reactions, but it should be stressed that Hamas has not provided more than minimal details on its view of the fighting, other than ideological and propaganda statements. Any military report has to be written largely from an Israeli perspective, although the impact of the fighting and its strategic outcome can be evaluated from a much broader perspective.
The analysis reveals impressive improvements in the readiness and capability of the Israeli Defense Forces since the fighting against the Hezbollah in 2006. It also indicates that Israel did not violate the laws of war. It did deliberately use decisive force to enhance regional deterrence and demonstrate that it had restored its military edge. These, however, are legitimate military objectives in spite of their very real humanitarian costs.
What is far less clear is that Israel's tactical successes achieved significant strategic and grand strategic benefits. In practice, any such benefits may actually have been more than offset by the mid and long-term strategic costs of the operation in terms of Arab and other regional reactions. Such conclusions are necessarily uncertain, but Israel does not seem to have been properly prepared for the political dimensions of war, or to have had any clear plan and cohesive leadership in achieving conflict termination. Moreover, it may have approach Hamas and the Arab world with attitudes that will increase instability in the region and ultimately weaken Israel's security.
This analysis is being circulated in final review form. Suggested additions, corrections, and revisions will be greatly appreciated.
Technorati Tag: Israel and Gaza and Hamas and Operation Cast Lead and International Law.
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