Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Mideast Media Sampler 06/21/2011

From DG:
1) Religious extremism in the Middle East

No not in Israel. In Egypt.



2) Friends don't let friends support terror

Foreign Affairs has a fascinating article, Aiding Friend and Foe in Palestine (h/t Retweet by Jonathan Schanzer )

Additionally, it could be argued that because Hamas does not control the PA outright, aid to the PA is not the same as aid to Hamas. This may seem persuasive in some circumstances; for instance, if Hamas held only a small minority of the PA’s parliamentary seats.
But that is hardly the case with regard to the current reconciliation agreement, which places equal power in the hands of Fatah and Hamas to form an interim government and appoint various ministers through consensus. Moreover, according to OFAC’s regulations, Hamas needs only an interest in PA transactions, rather than full control of the PA itself, to trigger sanctions against funding the PA. In fact, following Hamas’ election success in 2006, OFAC determined that Hamas had “a property interest” in PA business; this may have some bearing on funding the new unity government. Much like the OFAC regulations, the U.S. criminal code does not clearly specify when an FTO’s interest in an organization becomes so great that it is unlawful to provide that organization with “material support.” Moreover, the serious penalties associated with violating these criminal laws demand caution when considering whether to aid an organization in which an FTO such as Hamas plays a significant role. 
Another possible method for the United States to continue funding the PA is an exception in the criminal code for persons who provide “personnel,” “training,” or “expert advice or assistance” to an FTO with approval of the secretary of state and the attorney general. This exception could allow the United States to advise PA security and police forces, but it would not permit direct financial aid. Similarly, the United States could attempt to convince non-Hamas elements in the PA to use and disseminate U.S. funds without any knowledge or participation of Hamas. Yet such a plan may not withstand legal scrutiny. If non-Hamas PA officials failed to honor the agreement and Hamas gained access to U.S. funds, prosecutors might one day argue that the persons who made the donation knew that such a result was likely and disregarded the risk. Such “willful blindness” could serve as the basis of a criminal prosecution. Or, the whole government may turn out to be Hamas-affiliated, rendering any such distinction meaningless. 
The Obama administration could also instruct OFAC to grant specific exemptions so that the United States could fund particular entities within the PA. OFAC followed this strategy in 2006, announcing at the time that “consistent with current foreign policy” it was “authorizing U.S. persons to engage in certain transactions in which the PA may have an interest.” Mirroring some of the exceptions listed under PATA, OFAC exempted transactions with the Palestinian judiciary, non-Hamas members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and various entities controlled by Abbas. 
I guess for now as long as the unity accord doesn't seem to have been finalized, there's still some wiggle room. And I'd guess that Congress is less likely to allow exceptions than the administration. And I wonder why it is that allowing members of Hamas to write op-eds doesn't fall under this prohibition. Even though I've read that no payment is involved, space in a newspaper has value and that it being granted to a member of a terrorist organization.


3) What if?

Warren Kozak asks What if Jews had followed the Palestinian path?

By the 1990s, the real mayhem would have begun. Raised on victimhood and used as cannon fodder by corrupt leaders, a generation of younger Jews would be blowing up buses, restaurants and themselves. The billions of dollars extorted from various governments would not have gone to the inhabitants of the camps. The money would be in the Swiss bank accounts of the refugees' famous and flamboyant leaders and their lackies.
So now it's the present, generations past the end of World War II, and the festering Jewish refugee problem throughout Europe has absolutely no end in sight. The worst part of this story would be the wasted lives of millions of human beings in the camps—inventions not invented, illnesses not cured, high-tech startups not started up, symphonies and books not written—a real cultural and spiritual desert.
None of this happened, of course. Instead, the Jewish refugees returned to their ancestral homeland. They left everything they had in Europe and turned their backs on the Continent—no "right of return" requested. They were welcomed by the 650,000 Jewish residents of Israel. 
The other day Thomas Friedman used a lemon metaphor; but this is an example of making lemonade from lemons.


4) Turnip Truck Tom III

Once again I return to Sunday's, What to do with Lemons by Thomas Friedman

Here's how Friedman describes the current situation and what he claims needs to come next:

The Obama team is in a fix. The Palestinian Authority, having lost faith in both Israel and the U.S., is pushing for the United Nations to recognize an independent Palestinian state, within the 1967 lines in the West Bank and Gaza. Once that is in hand, the Palestinian Authority could then start a global push to pressure Israel into withdrawing its settlers and security forces, or face sanctions and delegitimization. Israel is obviously opposed to this move. The U.S. has no desire to support such a one-sided resolution, which would alienate Israel and American Jews. But it also has no desire to veto such a resolution, which would only complicate America’s standing in the Arab-Muslim world. 
As an alternative, the U.S. is trying to get the parties to resume peace talks on a comprehensive agreement based on terms laid out by the president in mid-May — two states for two peoples, with the 1967 lines as the starting point, and then whatever land swaps Israelis and Palestinians mutually agree to beyond that. But if the parties won’t accept this — and for now they are resisting — then we’re headed for a real train wreck at the U.N. in September. 
Note his qualification, "if the parties won't accept this." But twice before something like this has been offered by Israel, twice before it has been rejected by the Palestinians.

After Arafat rejected Barak's offer at Camp David and started the "Aqsa intifada" Friedman wrote, Arafat's War

Palestinians were shocked by Mr. Clinton's assessment. For the first time in a long time, Mr. Arafat no longer had the moral high ground. He, and the Arab leaders, had grown so comfortable with Bibi Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel -- a man the world always blamed for any peace breakdown -- that they were stunned and unprepared for the seriousness of Mr. Barak's offer and the bluntness of Mr. Clinton's assessment. Other world leaders told Mr. Arafat the same thing: Barak deserves a serious counteroffer.
Mr. Arafat had a dilemma: make some compromises, build on Mr. Barak's opening bid and try to get it closer to 100 percent -- and regain the moral high ground that way -- or provoke the Israelis into brutalizing Palestinians again, and regain the moral high ground that way. Mr. Arafat chose the latter. So instead of responding to Mr. Barak's peacemaking overture, he and his boys responded to Ariel Sharon's peace-destroying provocation. In short, the Palestinians could not deal with Barak, so they had to turn him into Sharon. And they did.
So Israel defending itself is turning "into Sharon" not a course of action that any country would pursue. And Arafat's offer and resulting turn to violence didn't delegitimize him, it just meant that he lost the moral high ground.

In early 2009 after Mahmoud Abbas refused Ehud Olmert's offer, Friedman wrote, This is not a test.
The Palestinians are so fragmented politically and geographically that half of U.S. diplomacy is going to be about how to make peace between Palestinians, and build their institutions, so there is a coherent, legitimate decision-making body there — before we can make peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
Second, Hamas now has a veto over any Palestinian peace deal. It’s true that Hamas just provoked a reckless war that has devastated the people of Gaza. But Hamas is not going away. It is well armed and, despite its suicidal behavior of late, deeply rooted. 
The Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank will not make any compromise deal with Israel as long as it fears that Hamas, from outside the tent, would denounce it as traitorous. Therefore, Job 2 for the U.S., Israel and the Arab states is to find a way to bring Hamas into a Palestinian national unity government. 
( At this point Olmert had made an offer that had been rejected by Abbas; though not all the details were known at the time. 

In late December, 2008 in a rather unfair column, Olmert's Final Failure, Jackson Diehl wrote:
Worst of all, Abbas followed in a long tradition of previous Palestinian leaders by reacting to a far-reaching Israeli offer with an uncourageous demurral. Olmert has never publicly disclosed the terms he discussed with Abbas, but sources say he went well beyond what Israel agreed to at the Camp David talks of 2000, previously the closest approach to a deal. I'm told Olmert offered to support the groundbreaking concession of allowing thousands of Palestinian refugees to "return" to Israel over a period of years; he also agreed to divide Jerusalem between Israel and Palestine. Abbas, like Yasser Arafat at Camp David, refused to sign on to a compromise that the world would have hailed. 
Abbas had, however, broken off negotiations after Israel launched Cast Lead to stop the rocket fire from Gaza. )

Think about the implications of what Friedman writes here. Hamas is an unrepentant terror organization, therefore Israel must bring it into the peace process!

The pattern is clear, despite Friedman's writing about a "counteroffer" in late 2000, he really doesn't mean it. What he means is that Israel must keep sweetening the pot to make the Palestinians happy and it is only Palestinian happiness that determines Israel's legitimacy. To Friedman, there is no Palestinian action that renders their nationalism illegitimate. Turning to terror just means that Israel needs to accommodate the Palestinians further. It's amazing that anyone takes Friedman seriously. To Friedman there is no Palestinian action that is illegitimate and yet unless Israel accedes to every Palestinian demand Israel is (or will be) illegitimate.

There isn't a country in the world that would follow this advice. And outside of the asylum and the op-ed page of the New York Times there is no one who would offer it.
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2 comments:

NormanF said...

The other point just made by Omri Ceren, is the Palestinians aren't ready for statehood. They have no functioning government and they have no independent economy. The PA and Hamas are totally reliant on foreign aid to survive and remain in power and neither can fulfill the basic functions of a sovereign government: to be self-financing, to protect its people and to uphold international commitments. That reality in part is why the PA's statehood in September at the UN is destined to go nowhere.

Daled Amos said...

But if you are a country that is convince that giving them a state is the key to magically stabilizing the Middle East--you may not care if the Palestinians are ready for a state. Just create the entity.

If it fails, Europe and others did their share--and the Arab world should have no hard feelings.