Mideast Media Sampler 07/06/2011

Fro DG:

1) Brakes on Islamists

After the Turkish election I was skeptical of analyses that portrayed the AKP's victory as a triumph of democracy. Sonor Cagaptay seems to be taking a slightly different approach. The development of the Republican Peoples Party (or CHP) into a true opposition party, is what encourages Cagaptay.

This is now changing. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is fashioning a new CHP, embracing certain Kemalist values, such as gender equality and individual liberties, while jettisoning its methodology. More importantly, after the AKP dropped the ball on European Union accession, the new CHP picked it up, arguing that EU membership must remain a top foreign policy priority if Turkey is to become a true liberal democracy.

With a record number of women in the new party assembly and a fresh approach to the country's festering Kurdish question (such as their proposal to implement Kurdish language education), the CHP appears to be emerging as a liberal force.

For the first time, the Turks have a credible progressive alternative to the AKP. As a result, Turkey, a unique democracy balancing Islam, secularism and a sense of Western identity, has a chance to address its "yin and yang" problem.

This is not the same as "the AKP didn't get a supermajority."

Barry Rubin is finding resistance to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in an unlikely place.

The prestigious al-Azhar is a conservative traditionalist institution that has been dominated by Egypt’s regime and used to oppose revolutionary Islamists. The Egyptian government decided who would run al-Azhar, who would be the country’s chief mufti (authority on Islamic law), who would preach in the mosques, who could build a mosque, and what clerics could appear on television and other media. If you wanted to build a career as an important Islamic cleric in Egypt you needed to get the rulers to like you. Their Islamist critics called them “parrots,” not only because they repeated the government line but also because a parrot is used like the English word, “bird-brained.”

Over the years, however, the establishment has made concessions to the new wave of radical interpretations. For the last few months, following Mubarak’s downfall, the al-Azhar leadership appeared ready to cut its own deal with the Brotherhood.

But the Brotherhood pushed too hard, demanding a totally new leadership for Egypt’s religious institutions. Facing a choice between resistance and total surrender (getting fired and perhaps facing a firing squad), al-Azhar’s heads decided to oppose the fundamental transformation of Egyptian society by the Brotherhood.

Self interest is a powerful motivator.

David Schenker thinks that the indictments of four members of Hezbolllah in the killing of Rafiq Hariri will hurt the organization.

Now, for an organization that has long described itself as “the Resistance” to Israel, the revelation that it also specializes in killing Sunni Muslims will, at a minimum, be problematic. Although Nasrallah has spent the better part of the past two years trying to discredit the tribunal, few in the largely Sunni Muslim Middle East will question the court’s accusation that the militia played a central role in the murder of Hariri, the leader of Lebanon’s Sunni community. Indeed, the Arab Spring has contributed to a spike in Sunni-Shiite tensions. Pro-democracy demonstrations in Bahrain, for example, were largely seen by Gulf Arabs as an attempt by the Shiite theocracy in Iran to subvert the Sunni monarchy. In Syria, meanwhile, the rallying cry of the largely Sunni Muslim opposition to the Alawite Assad regime has been “No to Iran, No to Hezbollah!” Given these sentiments—and despite the residual respect for the accomplishments of the organization—the indictment will likely be seen through a largely sectarian prism.

Moreover, the accusations are bound to foment discontent within Nasrallah’s organization, and potentially result in some diminished support for the militia in Lebanon. While they will not come as a shock to anyone, of course, they will reopen old wounds, enraging Lebanon’s Sunni Muslims and, perhaps, disillusioning a few of Hezbollah’s Christian allies. At the same time, some Shiites—Hezbollahis and the organization’s constituents—will likely view the indictments as a liability and may seek to provoke another conflict with Israel, a la 2006, to distract attention from the tribunal. But regardless of Nasrallah’s bravado, Shiites in south Lebanon do not crave another costly war with Israel or a return to civil war at home.

The AKP, Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah are all still powerful, but each seems to have a hit a speed bump. How significant these obstacles are remains to be seen.


2) Iran's boasts

Iran is claiming self sufficiency in its weapons program:

Iranian officials claim they are already there. Defense Minister Gen. Ahmad Vahidi said the current war games highlight the futility of U.N. sanctions over Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment.
“The war games ... show Iran’s great capability in designing, producing and using various kinds of missiles based on domestic knowledge. This showed that the sanctions imposed had no effect on Iran’s missile program,” Vahidi claimed in comments posted Saturday on sepahnews.com, the official website of Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard.

Iran says it already has missiles with ranges of up to 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers) — putting Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf and parts of Europe within reach.

Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari head of the Iran's Revolutionary Guards boasted of his organization's power in Iran.

In the interview, Jafari -- appointed to his post by the country's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei -- took it upon himself to outline the conditions he would set for the return to politics of reformists -- including former President Mohammad Khatami, who was elected to office twice with more than 70% of the popular vote. 

"Members of the reformist camp who have not crossed the red lines can naturally participate in political campaigns," he said. "However, Mr. Khatami's success in his activities depends on his stances. Mr. Khatami did not pass his test successfully during the sedition incident and he showed a lot of support for the sedition leaders."
...
Jafari also spoke about the IRGC's involvement in the economy, particularly the energey sector, where its construction wing -- Khatim Anbiya -- has taken on a gas exploration project in the Persian Gulf. 

This confidence is worrying and Israel's head of Military Intelligence outlined some of its effects regarding Israel. In a closed hearing, according to a participant, Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi said about Iran:

"They are transferring knowledge, technical aid and means for dispersing demonstrations," he was quoted as saying. "Iran and Hezbollah's motivation to help (Syria) results from their fear of the implications of the demonstrations, particularly of losing their partnership with the Syrians and a trickling of protests into their territory."

He added it is far too soon to write off Syrian President Bashar Assad, saying the military has remained loyal to him and there is no indication of a wave of massive defections of top officers.
The general said Iran is specifically trying to strengthen its relations with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood ahead of planned September elections there and has begun funding the organization as well.

3) More on YIISA

Writing in Tablet, Jamie Kirchik observed:

Her vague criticism of the program aside, Lipstadt agrees that Small was treading on dangerous academic territory. “You can teach about Islamophobia, but you can’t teach about Muslim anti-Semitism. If you were to teach about Muslim anti-Semitism, somehow you would be seen by some people as having a vendetta.” Lipstadt thinks that this political bias did play a role in YIISA’s demise, but that doesn’t excuse what she thinks was Small’s unnecessary blurring of the line between scholarship and advocacy. “I think there were people who were anxious to see it fail. But when you know there are people out gunning for you, don’t give them a bullet.”   

Lipstadt’s concern raises a fundamental question in the debate over YIISA: Where does the realm of scholarship end and advocacy begin? YIISA was hardly more political or activist than a vast array of programs of dubious academic merit, whether African-American studies, Chicano studies, gay and lesbian studies, and so on, which have long been accepted as integral to American universities. Nor was Small’s approach any more partisan than those of Edward Said, Rashid Khalidi, Joseph Massad or other professors who teach about the modern Middle East at Ivy League universities. Moreover, it is difficult to see how one can avoid advocacy on the subject of anti-Semitism when producing scholarly work on the subject. When I posed this question to YIISA critic Jeffrey Alexander, asking whether or not a discipline like gay and lesbian studies is not inherently sympathetic to the plight of gay people, he replied: “Israel is not an oppressed group that we’re supposed to feel this enormous sympathy for, in the same way as gays and lesbians.”

Kirchik is clear that he doesn't think this was the only reason YIISA was closed. Another factor may well have been simply academic arrogance.


In a similar vein, Jeffrey Herf writes in TNR:

First, continuation of the current situation of great interest in some forms of racism and anti-Semitism but less interest in others amounts to establishment of a tacit double standard. Yale’s historians have made significant contributions to the history of white racism, slavery, and its aftermath, efforts that continue at the Gilder-Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance and Abolition under David Blight’s able leadership. Furthermore, American historians have made major contributions to scholarship on Nazism and the Holocaust. Indeed, the standard applied to scholarly examination of white racism directed at people of color (provided that these racist views come from white Americans and Europeans, but not, for example, from the government of Sudan) has been harsh and unforgiving. Similarly, the moral rejection and scholarly denunciation of anti-Semitism when it comes from Europe has been equally critical. Yet another standard, one accompanied with excuses, apologia, denials, avoidance, and “contextualization,” surrounds examination of Jew-hatred when its source is Islamist, Arabic, or Iranian. Though the verbal rejection of Jew-hatred exists, the willingness to actually write its history has been done primarily by historians of Nazism, as well as some excellent Israeli historians who work on the Arab world or on Iran. The result is that the advancement of knowledge—the primary purpose of a research university—is being slowed above all for political reasons.

In a related issue, Daniel Pipes writes about Middle East studies in upheaval:

Little did I know, but by taking up Islamic history when I did meant slipping in before the deluge of revisionism. Back in 1969, scholars respected Islamic civilization while usually (but not always) maintaining a proudly Western outlook. Symbolic of old-fashioned learning, my first Middle East history professor assigned us Julius Wellhausen's study, Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz (in English translation to be sure), published in 1902. 

Then came the revolution. Martin Kramer ascribes the changes in Middle East studies to the publication of Orientalism by Edward Said in 1978; I see it more resulting from the sharp leftward turn of universities. Whatever the cause, the field descended into revisionist, apologetic, jargon-laden, error-prone Third-Worldism. The old masters dropped out of syllabi. The Hartford Seminary rapidly "turned from being the premier Protestant seminary for missions to the Muslim world into an institution promoting Islamization." The academic understanding of jihad epitomizes this transformation: in a single generation, jihad went from being interpreted as aggressive warfare to moral self-improvement. Academics took their biased and shoddy work into government.

4) "...[it's] a guy sitting in his living room in his pajamas."

One of the things that drew me to blogs and blogging was the realization that amateurs could make unsupported assumptions just as well - or better - as highly trained and paid reporters and pundits. A couple of recent news items show a contrast in the styles of the MSM and the pajamas crowd.

The other day I critiqued a news analysis by Ethan Bronner. The thrust of Bronner's analysis was that each side (the Hamas supporters and Israel) were spinning the news about the flotilla, but the real story being missed was plight of the people in Gaza. Given that the blockade was a response to a very real military threat, Bronner was negligent in not explicitly mentioning that threat. But in the end, Bronner wrote:

His argument about the flotilla points to the larger dynamic: the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is increasingly disintegrating from a debate over borders and security into a battle between those claiming that Israel is a genocidal machine and those who dismiss every attack on its policy as an assault on its essence. 

He got the part of the "genocidal machine" correct, but the other side is a straw man. Those of us who defend Israel don't see "every attack on its policy as an assault on its essence," but MANY criticisms of Israel are more properly classified as condemnations.

He could even have quoted one of the flotilla's organizers toward that end. And its a sentiment that even Mahmoud Abbas agrees to. If the Israeli-Palestinian dispute was only about borders and security, it would have been solved by now. But it's about Israel's legitimacy and existence. Though this wasn't about the flotilla, Jonathan Spyer'srecent observation proved this point:

Here, then, is the display that greets European diplomats, salaried peace processors, and elegant locals meeting in the courtyard and coffee shop, passing or entering the bookshop of the beautiful and peaceful American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem.

Four volumes. One of which, though written by a man of conscience, serves the purpose of describing an instance of Israeli killing of civilians. The other three are united in calling for the destruction of Israel. One of them denies the Holocaust. All of them, in great detail, set about seeking to deny the most basic facts of Jewish history, to ridicule all Jewish concerns deriving from that history, and to make of the Jews a non-people, not to be included in the general mass of humanity but rather to be uniquely singled out in illegitimacy.

This is the ideology behind the flotillas, boycotts, and furious demonstrations against Israel in the year 2011, decades after the Palestinians supposedly accepted Israel’s existence and turned toward seeking a two-state solution. This is the idea behind which Islamists and “progressives” can happily unite. This is the channel through which the familiar and foul substance of antisemitism is going to flow right back into the Western mainstream. Unless it is prevented from doing so.

Dr. Spyer could have added journalists to his list. But this is the reality that Bronner tries so hard to ignore.

Yesterday I gave Joel Greenberg a free pass for With Gaza flotilla stalled both sides claim victory. In retrospect I should have been more critical. Why in the world did he quote Medea Benjamin? There is no evidence that the flotilla organizers got anything they wanted. So by including Benjamin's hollow claims of victory, he was spreading propaganda, not reporting news. 

Compare Greenberg's "he said she said" style reporting to Hadar Sela's comprehensive and DOCUMENTED account of how the flotilla was foiled.

While the IHH cited technical problems as the reason for the refitted ship’s withdrawal, there is reason to believe that diplomatic pressures and internal Turkish political factors as well as difficulties in obtaining insurance for the voyage may have played a part.  Having just won the parliamentary elections, the Turkish government has no need to provoke a major new crisis with Israel and antagonize a U.S. government that seems content to tolerate its other policies.

The UN secretary general’s appeal to the governments of countries in the Mediterranean region to use their influence to discourage the flotilla and the announcement that the UN’s investigation into the previous flotilla has concluded that the naval blockade of Gaza is in keeping with international law no doubt encouraged the European Union and the many individual Western governments which issued subsequent statements dissuading their citizens from participating in the project. Such concerns were not raised prior to the previous flotilla.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went further and described the intended voyage as “not helpful” and provocative after the State Department had issued repeated official warnings to the 36 American participants that they should not attempt to make the journey to the “dangerous and volatile” region, together with reminders regarding penalties under U.S. law for providing support to foreign terrorist organizations.

Worse, the organizers ticked off some of their supporters with their high handed methods, as Yochanan Visser showed. Furthermore, as Visser concludes:

While these developments have exposed the Gaza flotilla as an operation of Hamas and radical left groups seeking to delegitimize and discredit Israel, they also have much broader significance. What has happened in Holland is a case study showing how Internet publications and research on the hidden radicalism and extremist ties of purportedly humanitarian and moderate groups can change government policy, media attitudes, and public opinion.

Whether we're talking generally about the fundamental issues in the Middle East or specifically about the flotilla, the guys in their pajamas outclassed the "wedded to their narrative" MSM.

Technorati Tag: Israel and Middle East.