Why Abbas Wouldn't Survive Peace With Israel

Babe, I love you so
I want you to know
That I'm goin' to miss your love
The minute you walk out that door
KC & The Sunshine Band, Please Don't Go

Imagine how much Abbas would miss the IDF, when it comes time for them to go--and that may be the reason that Abbas is dragging his feet at this latest iteration of the peace talks. Hillel Frisch, Associate Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and Senior Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, writes:

Substantive progress in negotiating peace is hardly what Abbas and the West Bankers want, let alone feel they can get. The real reason for their reticence in making such progress since 2007 is related to the danger Hamas poses to the West Bank leadership.
Though the number of West Bankers arrested by Israeli forces declined from 8,000 in 2006 to 5,000 in 2009, their sheer numbers still indicate that Hamas, and to a much lesser extent, Islamic Jihad, remain a substantial threat to Abbas, and that the threat of a Hamas takeover in Judea and Samaria has yet to dissipate.

Dealing with this threat entails good security cooperation between Abbas and Israeli security forces – an arrangement in which Israel deals with the Hamas terrorist infrastructure by night while Abbas’ security forces harass Hamas terrorists Israel releases by day – as well as the dismantling of social infrastructure that Hamas has created painstakingly over the years.

Abbas is essentially using the IDF to gain the kind of political and security foothold Arab leaders recognize as being essential to the art of ruling. He is also assuming the role of the traditional Arab ruler – controlling all the funds, avoiding elections (which will only be held if the outcome is a foregone conclusion), reducing the regime’s party to an arm of the executive, allowing no opposition, and making sure that his picture appears daily on the front page of the media. Only such a ruler qualifies as a member of the quintessential Arab leaders’ club.

Such security cooperation can hardly take place once any kind of peace arrangement is achieved. At that point, Israeli security presence in Judea and Samaria, a daily feature of West Bank life since the Defensive Shield operation in April 2002, would have to cease. This would leave Abbas’ security forces to face Hamas alone. So, Abbas prefers not to make progress in the peace talks until the terrorist swamp is more effectively dried up. He is treading on that path but has not gotten far enough to make the kind of progress in the peace process that would make Israeli security forays politically impossible.

Of course, it would be easier to dry up that swamp if not for the corruption and incompetence of Abbas and the Palestinian Authority--which is why there is really no sign of the Hamas swamp being dried up in the near future. Even then, there is Hamas in Gaza.

That of course is the opening for those who say that Hamas therefore has to be a part of the peace talks--in spite of the fact that by their very Charter, Hamas has already clearly stated that peace is not an option.

For some, it appears that there is a fine line between peace partner and terrorist.

Hat tip: Arlene Kushner

Technorati Tag: Abbas and Mideast Peace Talks and Hamas.